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Abstract 
Stock market liberalizations lead private investment booms.  In a sample of 11 
developing countries that liberalized, 9 experience growth rates of private investment 
above their non-liberalization median in the first year after liberalizing.  In the second 
and third years after liberalization this number is 10 of 11 and 8 of 11 respectively.  The 
mean growth rate of private investment in the three years immediately following stock 
market liberalization exceeds the sample mean by 22 percentage points.  The evidence 
stands in sharp contrast with recent work that suggests capital account liberalization has 
no effect on investment. 
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1.  Introduction 
A stock market liberalization is a decision by a country’s government to allow 
foreigners to purchase shares in that country’s stock market.  Standard models of 
international asset pricing predict that stock market liberalization may reduce the 
liberalizing country’s cost of equity capital.1  This prediction has two important 
empirical implications for those emerging countries that liberalized their stock markets in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.  First, if stock market liberalization reduces the aggregate 
cost of equity capital, then, holding expected future cash flows constant, we should 
observe an increase in a country’s equity price index when the market learns that a stock 
market liberalization is going to occur.  The second implication is that we should observe 
an increase in physical investment following a stock market liberalization, because a fall 
in a country’s cost of equity capital will transform some investment projects that had a 
negative net present value (NPV) before liberalization into positive NPV endeavors after 
liberalization.  Henry (1999a) shows that the data confirm the first implication.  This 
paper examines whether the data are consistent with the second implication.  Specifically, 
in order to determine whether stock market liberalizations are associated with increased 
investment, this paper analyzes the behavior of real private investment following stock 
market liberalization in 11 emerging market countries. 
The mean growth rate of real private investment in the three years immediately 
following stock market liberalization exceeds the sample mean by 22 percentage points.  
Sign tests on medians confirm the robustness of the increase.  In the first year after 
liberalization, 9 of 11 countries experience growth rates of private investment above their 
non-liberalization median.  In the second and third years after liberalization this number 
  
2 
is 10 of 11 and 8 of 11 respectively.  The relationship between private investment and 
stock market liberalization persists after controlling for world business cycle effects, 
contemporaneous economic reforms, and domestic fundamentals.  However, we cannot 
conclude that stock market liberalizations cause investment booms, because the 
possibility of reverse causality cannot be ruled out.  
There are three reasons why stock market liberalization might cause a fall in the 
liberalizing country’s cost of equity capital, which consists of the risk free rate and the 
equity premium.2  First, stock market liberalization might increase net capital inflows, 
and an increase in net capital inflows could reduce the risk free rate.  Second, allowing 
foreigners to purchase domestic shares facilitates risk sharing between domestic and 
foreign residents; increased risk sharing should reduce the equity premium.  Finally, 
Levine and Zervos (1998b) demonstrate that increased capital inflows may also increase 
stock market liquidity; increased liquidity will also reduce the equity premium (Ahimud 
and Mendelson (1986, 1997)).  
Stock market liberalization is a specific type of a more general policy reform 
called capital account liberalization, which is a decision by a country’s government to 
remove restrictions on all capital inflows and outflows.  The empirical literature on 
capital account liberalization can be separated usefully into two strands: finance and 
macroeconomics.  Tesar (1995), Tesar and Werner (1998), and Stulz (1995, 1999a, 
1999b) provide comprehensive surveys of the finance literature on capital account 
liberalization and international risk sharing.  The central message is that the portfolios of 
developed-country investors are still biased toward domestic securities, but capital 
account liberalization has led to greater diversification.  The effects of increased financial 
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integration are most readily seen in emerging market stock prices.  Kim and Singal 
(1998), Henry (1999a), and Bekaert and Harvey (1998) find evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that stock market liberalization causes a one-time revaluation of emerging 
market stock prices and a fall in the cost of capital.  Levine and Zervos (1998b) provide 
evidence which suggests that stock market liberalization also increases liquidity.  These 
papers confirm that stock market liberalization has financial effects, but they do not 
address the investment question. 
On the other hand, the empirical macroeconomic literature looks at the impact of 
capital account liberalization on investment.  Levine and Zervos (1998a) examine 
whether a country experiences a permanent increase in the growth rate of its capital stock 
when its stock market becomes more integrated with the rest of the world.  They find no 
evidence that increased stock market integration leads to permanently higher capital 
stock growth rates.  This result is somewhat surprising given the evidence on the impact 
of stock market liberalization on countries’ cost of equity capital.  One possible 
explanation is that stock market liberalization leads to a temporary increase in the growth 
rate of the capital stock, not a permanent increase.   
Consider a closed economy Solow (1956) model in steady state so that the capital 
stock and the labor force are growing at the same rate.  Now suppose that the stock 
market is liberalized to foreign capital inflows.  If stock market liberalization reduces the 
cost of capital, agents will respond by driving down the marginal product of capital to the 
new cost of capital.  This can only occur if the capital stock temporarily grows faster than 
the labor force.  Once the marginal product of capital equals the post-liberalization cost 
of capital,3 the growth rate of the capital stock will return to its pre-liberalization rate 
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(i.e., the same rate as the labor force).  In other words, theory suggests that stock market 
liberalization will induce a temporary increase in the growth rate of a country’s capital 
stock.  This paper provides a sharp test of the theory by employing an event study 
approach that compares the growth rate of private investment4 during stock market 
liberalization episodes with the growth rate of private investment during non-
liberalization periods. 
 
1.1.  Overview  
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 briefly reviews previous work and 
explains the contribution of this paper relative to the existing literature.  Section 3 
presents a theoretical discussion of the channels through which stock market 
liberalization may affect aggregate valuation, the cost of capital, and investment.  The 
central message here is not that stock market liberalization will automatically reduce the 
liberalizing country’s cost of equity capital, but that it will probably change that 
country’s cost of capital.  Under reasonable assumptions, the theory predicts that stock 
market liberalization will cause a fall in the liberalizing country’s cost of equity capital.  
If stock market liberalization reduces a country’s aggregate cost of equity capital it will 
also cause a temporary increase in the growth rate of investment via the following 
mechanism:  
(1)  . InvestmenticestockAggregateSationtLiberalizStockMarke ⇒↑⇒↑ Pr
Thus, there are two tasks involved in determining whether the data support the theory.  
The first step involves examining the correlation of investment with both liberalization 
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and stock prices.  The second step involves determining whether the correlations, if they 
exist, can be given a causal interpretation.   
Section 4 analyzes the correlation of private investment growth and stock market 
liberalization.  First, the existing evidence on the impact of liberalization on risk sharing, 
valuation, and liquidity is summarized.  Next, the analysis turns to the growth rate of 
private investment during liberalization episodes in order to determine whether 
investment is unusually high following stock market liberalizations.  Examination of 
graphs, means, and medians all convey the same message: investment booms consistently 
follow stock market liberalizations. 
Section 5 analyzes the correlation between the growth rate of private investment 
and changes in stock market valuation.  Although Fischer and Merton (1984), Barro 
(1990), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) and others have shown that higher stock 
returns forecast increased future investment in the U.S., there is a paucity of evidence on 
this subject in less-developed countries(LDCs).5  With substantial heterogeneity in the 
nature of the financial sector across LDCs-- financial repression, government directed 
credit, and the prevalence of informal financial markets-- it is not obvious that the 
standard investment stock return correlations will hold.6  Regressions of private 
investment growth on stock returns demonstrate a positive and significant correlation. 
Section 6 explores alternative explanations for the investment boom.  Having 
demonstrated the plausibility of a causal link from liberalization to investment in 
Sections 4 and 5, the question in Section 6 is whether omitted variables or reverse 
causality can explain the investment liberalization correlations.  The analysis here is 
motivated by the fact that the political decision to liberalize may be endogenous; 
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governments have an incentive to liberalize the stock market when there is good news 
about the future.  Specifically, liberalizations are probably timed to coincide with (1) 
high points in the world business cycle, (2) the implementation of other economic 
reforms, and (3) positive shocks to aggregate demand and the terms of trade.  Including 
regressors that try to capture these effects explains part of the boom, but stock market 
liberalization retains a statistically significant and an economically meaningful effect on 
the growth rate of private investment. 
The issue of reverse causality is more problematic.  Timing evidence is presented 
which suggests that stock markets are not liberalized in response to investment booms.  
However, the evidence cannot rule out the possibility that policymakers liberalize in 
anticipation of future shocks to the marginal product of capital.  Therefore, we cannot 
conclude that stock market liberalizations cause investment booms.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Previous Work 
For clarity, it is worth explaining the contributions of this paper relative to Levine 
and Zervos (1998a) and why the results here may differ from theirs.  The first 
contribution is that this paper asks whether stock market liberalization causes a 
temporary increase in the growth rate of the capital stock, whereas Levine and Zervos 
(1998a) ask if increased stock market integration causes a permanent increase.  This 
difference in questions leads to methodological differences.  Specifically, the estimation 
procedure used in this paper allows for the fact that stock market liberalization dates 
differ across countries.  Levine and Zervos use the same break point, 1985, for all of the 
countries in their sample.  Choosing a homogenous break point does not induce important 
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biases into Levine and Zervos’s empirical procedure since they are testing for a 
permanent effect.  However, since this paper tests for temporary effects, it is important to 
capture country-specific stock market liberalization dates as accurately as possible.  This 
paper identifies discrete, country-specific stock market liberalizations using a systematic 
dating procedure.7  This dating procedure facilitates an event study approach which 
provides a transparent test of whether stock market liberalization leads to a temporary 
increase in the growth rate of investment.  
This paper makes a second contribution by only including developing countries in 
the sample.  Levine and Zervos’ study contains both developed and developing countries.  
If the general consensus that developing countries have a higher autarky cost of capital 
than developed countries is true, 8 then increased stock market integration will lead to 
faster rates of capital accumulation in developing countries, but slower rates in developed 
countries.  With both developing and developed countries included in their sample, 
Levine and Zervos’ results may suggest that capital account liberalization has no effect 
on investment, but the results may also reflect the differing effects of liberalization in 
each of their subsamples.  
A third contribution of this paper is that it puts together a time series of country-
specific policy changes that helps disentangle the impact of stock market liberalization 
from the potentially confounding effects of contemporaneous economic reforms.  The 
paper also controls for time-specific shocks such as fluctuations in the world business 
cycle. 
The final contribution of this paper is that instead of using total investment, it 
focuses on private investment.  Total investment is the sum of public (government), 
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private, and foreign direct investment (FDI).  The empirical analysis in this paper is 
based on the theoretical relationship between investment and the shadow value of capital 
in the stock market.  This is implicitly a theory about private, not government, investment 
behavior.  Therefore, private investment may be more appropriate.  The behavior of FDI 
is analyzed separately in section 4.  
While it is desirable to understand the implications of stock market liberalization 
for general economic performance, this paper focuses on investment, because there is an 
unresolved debate as to whether capital account liberalization has any effect on real 
investment (Obstfeld 1998, Rodrik 1998, Stiglitz 1998).  Levine and Zervos (1998a) 
provide an important first step in documenting that capital account liberalization does not 
lead to a permanent increase in the growth rate of the capital stock.  This does not 
necessarily mean, however, that capital account liberalization has no effect on 
investment.  Liberalization might lead to a temporary increase in the growth rate of the 
capital stock.  Given the empirical complications inherent in trying to isolate the impact 
of capital account liberalization and the fact that there has been no formal analysis of the 
temporary hypothesis, it seems reasonable to focus on establishing a reliable set of facts 
about investment and liberalization before tackling broader issues.  
 
3. Stock Market Liberalization, Stock Prices, and Investment: Theory 
3.1 Autarky Stock Market Valuation 
As motivation for the empirical analysis to follow, this section presents a 
theoretical discussion of the channels through which stock market liberalization may 
influence aggregate valuation and physical investment.  Assume that both the domestic 
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stock market and money market are closed to foreign investors.  Let tΠ  denote expected 
aggregate profit per unit of capital and let  denote the expected present value of 
aggregate profit per unit of capital.
tV
9 Since it is not central to the argument, ignore 
depreciation of the capital stock.  Further, let  be the autarky domestic real interest rate, tr
tθ  the autarky equity premium, and assume that the world risk free rate, , is less than 
the domestic risk free rate .
*
tr
tr
10  For simplicity of exposition, assume that firms expect 
future interest rates, the equity premium, and profit per unit of capital to remain constant.  
Since increased risk sharing has theoretically and empirically ambiguous implications for 
the domestic savings rate,11 assume that stock market liberalization has no effect on the 
domestic savings rate.  Finally, assume that stock market liberalization has no effect on 
Π . 
Given these assumptions, it must be the case that in autarky the value of the stock 
market is given by 
 
(2)     θ+
Π=
r
Vt . 
 
Now let  be the price of a unit of physical capital and assume that KP
 
(3)     kt Pr
V =+
Π= θ  
 
so that the market for capital is in equilibrium and firms are indifferent to investing.  
Equation (3) highlights the fact that the discount rate used in evaluating firms’ existing 
projects consists of two components: the real risk-free rate of return and the equity 
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premium.  Starting from this equilibrium, suppose that the stock market is liberalized to 
foreign investors, but the domestic money market remains closed. 
 
3.2 Stock Market Valuation After Liberalization 
Consider first the impact of stock market liberalization on the equity premium.  In 
autarky the equity premium, θ , will be proportional to the variance of the country’s 
aggregate cash flows.  Once liberalization takes place and the country’s stock market 
becomes fully integrated, its equity premium will be proportional to the covariance of the 
country’s aggregate cash flows with those of a world portfolio.  Therefore, the necessary 
condition for the equity premium to fall following liberalization is that the variance (the 
local price of risk) exceeds the covariance (the global price of risk).  Stulz (1999b) 
demonstrates empirically that every emerging market satisfies this necessary condition.  
Tesar and Werner (1997), Errunza and Miller (1998), and Bekaert and Harvey (1998) 
also argue that this condition holds in practice.  In keeping with the general consensus 
that the equity premium will fall when a completely segmented emerging country 
liberalizes its stock market,12 let  be the equity premium which prevails following 
stock market liberalization. 
θθ <*
 In addition to allowing for increased risk sharing, stock market liberalization may 
also lead to more liquid markets where trading equities is less costly (Levine and Zervos 
1998a, 1998b).  Ahimud and Mendelson (1986, 1997) find that increased liquidity 
reduces the equity premium,13 which decreases the cost of capital and raises firm value.  
Thus, from a valuation standpoint, the empirical implications of increased liquidity are 
observationally equivalent to the implications of increased risk sharing.  An increase in 
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either, or both, reduces the equity premium.  It is therefore important to bear in mind that 
in addition to increased risk sharing, increased liquidity plays a central role in any 
liberalization-induced valuation and investment boom.  The relative roles of risk sharing 
and liquidity are discussed further in Section 5.2. 
Now consider the impact of stock market liberalization on the risk-free rate.  
Although the assumption is that the domestic money market remains closed following the 
stock market liberalization, the stock market liberalization may have an indirect effect on 
the domestic risk-free rate.  As we have assumed that the domestic savings rate is 
constant, the capital inflow generated by stock market liberalization increases the total 
stock of loanable funds.  This increase could cause the domestic risk-free rate to fall.  Let  
rr <~  be the post-liberalization risk-free rate.  Finally, by assumption liberalization has 
no impact on the numerator, Π .  Therefore, after the stock market is liberalized 
aggregate valuation is given by: 
 
(4)     kt Pr
V >+
Π= ** ~ θ . 
 
Stock liberalization drives a wedge between market valuation and the price of a new 
machine, thereby generating an incentive for firms to invest in physical capital. 
 
3.3 Objections to the Theoretical Framework 
There are two key objections to this description of the impact of a stock market 
liberalization on a country’s aggregate valuation and investment.  First, it is possible that 
the autarky risk-free rate might be lower than the world risk-free rate.  Second, it may not 
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be reasonable to assume that expected future profits and stock market liberalization are 
uncorrelated.  Each of these objections is now considered in turn.   
Suppose that *rr <  and we allow for the more realistic assumption that the 
domestic money market is also liberalized when the stock market is opened.  In this case, 
in addition to the capital inflow into the stock market, capital will flow out of the 
domestic money market until the domestic risk free rate rises to the world risk free rate.  
Although the equity premium still falls due to increased risk sharing, under this scenario 
the countervailing effect of an increase in r  might lead to a net increase in the discount 
rate.  Therefore, if *rr <  in autarky, the post-liberalization cost of capital might actually 
rise following stock market liberalization.  If we observed internal, market-determined 
interest rates in these countries it would be instructive to compare pre and post 
liberalization interest rates.  Unfortunately, all of the countries in this sample had some 
form of financial repression in place during the period according to Williamson and 
Mahar (1998).14  In lieu of data on internal market rates, I now consider the plausibility 
of this alternative assumption that *rr < . 
The autarky interest rate is an equilibrium outcome of domestic savings and 
investment.  Historically, a number of emerging Asian countries have had very high 
savings rates relative to the developed countries.  In the context of high autarky savings 
rates, it is plausible that a poor country might have a lower autarky risk free rate than the 
world risk-free rate.  On the other hand, high savings rate economies may also have more 
attractive investment opportunities.  Thus it is not clear that high savings-rate countries 
will necessarily have autarky interest rates which are lower than the world rate.  Even if 
its autarky risk free rate is lower than the world rate, the liberalizing country may still 
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experience a net capital inflow if its stock market liberalization is asymmetric in the 
sense that foreign portfolio inflows are liberalized but the outflow of residents’ savings is 
still subject to barriers.  Section 4 provides evidence on both stock market liberalization 
and restrictions on the outflow of residents’ savings. 
The central message from this discussion, then, is not that stock market 
liberalization will in all cases lead to a fall in a country’s cost of capital.  Rather, the 
point is that there are sound theoretical reasons to believe that stock market liberalization 
may change the liberalizing country’s cost of capital, with attendant implications for 
physical investment.  Ultimately, whether a country’s cost of capital rises or falls 
following stock market liberalization is an empirical question that must be considered 
case by case.  Evidence on this question is presented in Section 4. 
A second objection to the theoretical framework is that it assumes expected 
profits do not change when the stock market is liberalized.  To the extent that stock 
market liberalizations are correlated with events which improve a country’s physical 
investment opportunity set, this is clearly an unrealistic assumption.  Section 6 of the 
paper addresses this potential correlation by employing a detailed set of economic reform 
variables.  Other possible omitted variables that could lead to higher investment absent 
any impact of liberalization on the cost of capital are also considered. 
 
4. Stock Market Liberalization, Stock Prices, and Investment: Facts 
4.1. Stock Market Liberalization Dates 
 
Evaluating the growth rate of private investment following a country’s first stock 
market liberalization requires a systematic procedure for identifying the date of each 
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country’s initial stock market liberalization.  Official policy decree dates are used when 
they are available.  When policy decree dates are not available two alternatives are 
pursued.  First, many countries initially permitted foreign ownership through country 
mutual funds.  Since government permission is presumably a necessary condition for 
establishment of these funds, the date when the first country fund is established proxies 
for the official implementation date.  The second way of indirectly capturing official 
implementation dates is to monitor the IFC’s Investability Index.  The investability index 
is the ratio of the market capitalization of stocks that foreigners can legally hold to total 
market capitalization.  A large jump in the investability index is evidence of an official 
liberalization.  In what follows, the date of a country’s first stock market liberalization is 
defined as the first month with a verifiable occurrence of any of the following: 
liberalization by policy decree, establishment of the first country fund, or an increase in 
the investability index of at least 10 percent.  Table 1 lists the date on which each of the 
11 countries15 first liberalized its stock market, as well as the means by which it 
liberalized.  In particular, where the initial liberalization is through a country fund, the 
specific name of the country fund is given. 
Importantly, Table 1 also indicates whether these countries had restrictions on 
capital outflows at the time they liberalized foreign inflows into their stock markets.  An 
important point is that every country in Table 1 had restrictions on the outflow of 
domestic savings at the time its stock market was liberalized.  Thus, even if these 
countries had autarky risk free rates which were lower than the world risk free rate, it is 
reasonable to expect them to have experienced net capital inflows following their stock 
market liberalizations.  The simple valuation model in Section 3 predicts that a net capital 
  
15 
inflow should have increased these countries’ stock market valuations and reduced their 
cost of equity capital.  Section 4.2 examines whether the data support this prediction. 
 
4.2. Risk Sharing, Valuation, and Liquidity Changes Around Liberalization 
This subsection summarizes the existing evidence on the impact of stock market 
liberalization on risk sharing, aggregate valuation and liquidity.  Stulz (1999a, 1999b) 
argues that looking at returns around times of changes in the capital account regime of a 
country can provide the best picture of the impact of capital account liberalization on risk 
sharing and the cost of capital.  As a crude indicator of the individual response of each 
country’s stock market to liberalization, the last column of Table 1 documents the real 
percentage change in the stock market over the 12 months leading up to the 
implementation month of the first stock market liberalization.16  For example, for a 
country that first liberalized in December of 1991, the percentage change gives the 
percentage change in the dollar total return index from December 1990 to December 
1991. 
While the numbers in Table 1 do not account for contemporaneous reforms or 
changes in fundamentals, they suggest large changes in aggregate valuation associated 
with stock market liberalization.  Henry (1999a) shows that after controlling for 
economic reforms, macroeconomic fundamentals, and comovements with developed-
country stock markets, the valuation increases in Table 1 remain large and statistically 
significant.  The countries in his sample experience average cumulative abnormal returns 
of 26 percent in real dollar terms during an 8-month window leading up to the 
implementation of their initial stock market liberalization.17  Kim and Singal (1998), 
  
16 
Errunza and Miller (1998), and Bekaert and Harvey (1998) all find similar effects and 
argue that the numbers are consistent with a one-time revaluation of aggregate equity 
prices and a fall in the cost of capital.  While the evidence on valuation and the cost of 
capital is consistent with the hypothesis that stock market liberalization increases risk 
sharing, Levine and Zervos (1998b) document that stock market liberalization also 
increases market liquidity.  Therefore, the documented changes in valuation could be due 
to increased liquidity as well as risk sharing. 
4.3. Private Investment Data 
The private investment series comes from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database.  There are a total of 11 developing countries that have both 
liberalized their stock market and kept data on private investment.  Table 2, which 
presents summary statistics on the growth rate of real private investment for each 
country, illustrates that the sample contains a total of 151 observations of private 
investment.  Although there are a total of 151 private investment observations, it is 
important to keep in mind that world-wide shocks that are common to all 11 countries 
means that these observations may not be completely independent.  The empirical 
analysis controls for world-wide shocks by using time dummies and other proxies for the 
world business cycle. 
 
4.4. The Growth Rate of Private Investment Around Stock Market Liberalization 
Let T n* −  be the th year before stock market liberalization and define 
 as the real growth rate of private investment in country  in year 
n
Δ ln ln lnI I Iit it it≡ − −1 i
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t .  Further, let Δ Δln ( ln )I It i
i
≡
=
∑111 1
11
t .  Thus, Δ ln *IT  is the average growth rate of 
private investment across all 11 countries in the year of stock market liberalization.  
Figure 1, which is a plot of  in event time, suggests a strong lagged response of 
private investment to stock market liberalization.  The growth rate of private investment 
increases sharply in year T*+1, peaks in year T*+2, and returns to pre-liberalization 
magnitudes by year T*+4. 
tIlnΔ
The correlation between liberalization and investment at various dates is 
evaluated by estimating the following panel regression:  
(5)  ititititititiit YearPostLibPostLibPostLibLibI εββββα ++++++=Δ 321)ln( 4321 . 
 
iα  are country-specific dummies.   are year-specific dummies which are included 
to control for cross-country correlation in the error terms that might be induced by 
common world-wide shocks.
itYear
18  The first difference specification reflects a well-known 
problem of empirical investment equations, the presence of a highly serially correlated 
error term when run in levels.  The usual first difference specification relates 
 to stock returns (see Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers, 1993), but data on 
the stock of capital for each country are not available.  Hence the analysis throughout the 
paper follows Barro (1989) in using 
Δ ln(( / ) )I K t
Δ ln( )It  as the left-hand-side variable.19   is a 
variable which takes on the value 1 in the year that country  liberalizes its stock market; 
 takes on the value 1 in the first year after liberalization;  takes on the 
value 1 in the second year after liberalization;  takes on the value 1 in the third 
year after liberalization.  The results are presented in Table 3. 
Libi
i
PostLib i1 PostLib i2
iPostLib3
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The first row of Table 3 illustrates that the average growth rate of private 
investment is 22.5 percentage points above the sample mean in the first year after stock 
market liberalization, 27.1 percentage points in the second year, and 17.3 percentage 
points in the third year.  Heteroskedastic consistent (White) standard errors are given in 
parentheses.  Although the liberalization effects appear large and significant, there are 
three concerns.  First, in spite of the first difference specification, subsequent 
observations of investment growth in individual countries might be autocorrelated.  
Second, with 11 countries in the sample, one might worry that the results are driven by 
one or two large outliers.  Finally, although the estimates control for country-specific 
effects and common world-wide shocks, the right-hand-side of the estimated equation 
may be missing other important variables that exert an influence on investment.  Each of 
these issues is now discussed. 
Two procedures were used to evaluate whether autocorrelated disturbance terms 
are corrupting the signifcance levels reported in Table 3.  First, individual country 
regressions of private investment growth on a constant20 were performed to test for first-
order autocorrelation in the residuals.  Second, equation (5) was re-estimated using 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS), which allows for groupwise autocorrelation.  
For 7 of 11 countries the Durbin-Watson statistic indicated that there was no first-order 
serial correlation.21  For the other 4 countries the Durbin-Watson statistic was 
inconclusive.22  The FGLS estimates of equation (5) are reported in the second row of 
Table 3.  The mean growth rates of private investment in years T*+1, T*+2, and T*+3 
are 16.2, 29.2, and 18.9 percentage points above the sample mean respectively.  All three 
estimates are significant at the 1 percent level.  The similarity of the FGLS estimates in 
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row 2 (in both magnitude and statistical significance) to the estimates in row 1 suggest 
that autocorrelation is not a major statistical concern. 
In order to address the concern about outliers, the third row of Table 3 presents 
the results of a Wilcoxon signed rank test.  Specifically each country’s growth rate of 
investment in years T*, T*+1, T*+2, and T*+3 is compared to that country’s median 
growth rate of investment in non-liberalization years.  The Z-statistics reject the 
hypothesis that the median growth rate of investment during years T*+1, T*+2, and T*+3 
is equal to the median growth rate in non-liberalization years.  The fourth row of the table 
gives the results of a simple sign test.  It lists the number of countries with a growth rate 
of private investment below their country-specific median growth rate and gives the 
probability of finding at most this number of countries below their median.  Like row 3, 
row 4 of Table 3 demonstrates that the abnormally high growth rate of private investment 
in each of the three years immediately following stock market liberalization is a robust 
empirical regularity not driven by a few countries.  Finally, the concern that the estimates 
in Table 3 are overstated because of omitted variables is deferred until Section 6 where 
alternative controls for world-wide factors and a host of other possible omitted variables 
are considered.   
 
4.5 Foreign Direct Investment  
Another question that arises from looking at Figure 1 and Table 3 is whether the 
increase in private investment simply replaces FDI, or whether both increase.  This 
question is addressed by looking at the ratio of foreign direct investment to private 
investment.  Table 4 presents summary statistics on the ratio of foreign direct investment 
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to private investment.  The numbers indicate that the ratio of FDI to private investment 
tends to rise following stock market liberalization.  In year T*+1, 7 of 11 countries have a 
ratio of FDI to private investment in excess of their country-specific median.  In years 
T*+2 and T*+3 this number is 8 of 11 and 9 of 11 respectively. 
These numbers suggest that the increase in private investment does not simply 
substitute for FDI.  Following stock market liberalization, private investment increases, 
the ratio of FDI to private investment increases, and therefore the sum of private 
investment and FDI increases.  One explanation for why FDI increases is that stock 
market liberalization may be positively correlated with other changes that reduce the 
operating risk of foreign multinationals operating in an LDC.  In this case, the 
multinationals’ cost of capital may also fall.  Holding multinationals’ cost of capital 
constant, FDI may also increase if stock market liberalization is positively correlated 
with other economic reforms that increase the expected future cash flows from domestic 
investment.  The possibility that FDI rises because of higher expected future cash flows 
reinforces the concern that the magnitude of the private investment-liberalization 
correlations in Table 3 may be overstated.  Again, Section 6 of the paper directly 
addresses these issues. 
 
5. Investment-Stock Return Correlations 
As outlined in equation (1), the theory predicts that if stock market liberalization 
reduces the cost of capital it will also cause higher investment via its intermediate effect 
on aggregate stock market prices.  The correlations documented in Section 4 provide 
support for this transmission mechanism.  However, the ultimate validity of this theory 
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requires the existence of an intermediate empirical link from stock prices to investment.  
This section of the paper examines whether such a link exists.  
Figure 2 is a graph of annual stock returns and the annual growth rate of private 
investment in all 11 countries from 1977 to 1994.  The solid line, which is plotted against 
the left-hand-side scale, is the simple average of the logarithmic real local currency stock 
market return across all 11 countries.  The stock returns are constructed using the 
dividend-inclusive, local currency IFC Global Index taken from the International Finance 
Corporation’s Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB).  All stock market indices are 
deflated by consumer price indices from the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics.  The dashed line is the simple average of the growth rate of private 
investment. 
Figure 2 suggests that there are two components to the correlation between the 
stock market and investment.  First, there is a cross-sectional component: in a given year 
the stock market and investment tend to move in the same direction.  Second, there is a 
time series component: both investment and stock returns were higher after 1983, as the 
world economy moved out of recession.  As in Section 4, this means that although there 
are a total of 151 data points, they may not be completely independent.  Again, the 
estimation procedure controls for the possible cross-country correlation induced by 
common world shocks by using year-specific dummies. 
Let  and V  denote the real local currency value of private investment and the 
stock market index in country  in year .  Also, let 
Iit it
i t vit itV= Δ ln( ) .  The correlation 
between private investment and stock returns is evaluated by estimating panel regressions 
that allow for country-specific and time-specific effects: 
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(6)    ititnitiit YearvI εβα +++=Δ −1)ln( . 
 
The growth rate of private investment is regressed on contemporaneous, one-year-lagged 
and two-year-lagged stock returns.23  Investment is also regressed on all three lags 
simultaneously.  Regressions (1) through (4) in Table 5 indicate a positive correlation 
between stock returns and private investment.  The relationship is strongest between 
investment and one-year-lagged returns.  The coefficient on  is 0.132; a 1 percent 
increase in the stock market last year is followed by a 0.21 percent increase in the growth 
rate of private investment.  Neither the contemporaneous return on the market, , or the 
two-year-lagged change in the value of the stock market, , are significantly correlated 
with investment in year t.  Estimating the relationship with all three return variables 
entering simultaneously (regression [4]) yields the same conclusion.  Stock returns in 
year  strongly predict investment in year t  while contemporaneous and two-year-
lagged returns have little predictive power. 
vt−1
tv
vt−2
1−t
 
5.1. The Correlation of Investment and Liberalization-Specific Valuation Changes 
 
It is natural to ask whether the correlation between investment and generic 
changes in market valuation (the evidence presented in Table 5) is the same as the 
correlation between investment and liberalization-specific changes in valuation.  
Estimating the following equation provides the most transparent means of answering that 
question. 
(7)  
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The interactive coefficients measure the correlation of investment in year t  with a 
liberalization-specific valuation increase that took place in year nt − .  If there is no 
difference in the responsiveness of private investment to liberalization-specific and 
generic valuation increases, then we should observe: 41 ββ = , 52 ββ = , 63 ββ = . 
The results are presented in the last column of Table 5 (regression [5]).  4β , the 
coefficient on the interactive term, , is positive and significant and an F-
test reveals that it is statistically larger than the coefficient on .
2*2 −tvPostLib
vt−2
24  Whereas a generic 
one-percent increase in the stock market in year 2−t  has little or negative predictive 
power for investment in year , there is a positive and significant investment response in 
year  to a 1 percent increase in year 
t
t 2−t  that is associated with stock market 
liberalization.  The fact that investment is more strongly correlated with liberalization-
induced valuation increases than with generic valuation increases lends itself to two 
possible interpretations: (1) stock market liberalization helps firms distinguish between 
news-driven and noise-driven valuation increases; (2) there is an omitted variable 
problem.  Each of these interpretations is now considered. 
A firm observing a typical increase in its stock price doesn’t know whether that 
increase is due to news or noise.  Undertaking new physical investment in response to 
noise-driven valuation increases will make long-term shareholders worse off, because 
such investment drives down the marginal product of capital without an accompanying 
fall in the discount rate or an increase in expected future profits.25  However, when the 
stock market is liberalized, firms know that there has been a change in the fundamentals-- 
namely increased risk sharing.  The attendant equity price boom signals to firms that they 
can increase shareholder welfare by investing in new capital. 
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Investment may also be more strongly correlated with liberalization-induced 
changes in valuation than with generic changes, because regression (6) is missing 
variables which are positively correlated with both liberalization and investment.  Call 
this vector of variables Z.  If stock market liberalizations coincide with positive shocks to 
Z, then subsequent investment will appear more highly correlated with liberalization-
induced valuation changes, when in fact the omitted variable Z may be driving the 
increased capital formation.  Possible omitted variables are the subject of Section 6.  
 
5.2. Can Investment Stock-Return Correlations Tell us Something About the 
Importance of Liquidity for Investment? 
 
The discussion in Section 3 explained why liquidity and risk sharing have 
observationally equivalent valuation implications.  This fact raises an important 
interpretation issue.  Suppose we observe that a stock market liberalization generates a 
large increase in equity prices and a subsequent investment boom.  It would be useful to 
know how much of the investment increase is due to increased risk sharing versus 
increased liquidity.  Because increased risk sharing and increased liquidity both have 
valuation implications, we cannot disentangle their relative effects on investment by 
running horse races between changes in liquidity and changes in valuation.  However, 
Levine and Zervos (1998a) argue that regressing investment on liquidity and valuation 
may help us understand whether liquidity has an impact on investment that operates 
independently of the impact of liquidity on valuation.   
The absence of a significant coefficient on liquidity in a regression of investment 
growth on changes in valuation and changes in liquidity would suggest that all of the 
effect of increased liquidity on investment works through the impact of liquidity on 
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valuation.  On the other hand, suppose there is a positive and significant correlation 
between investment and liquidity after controlling for valuation.  Then, to the extent that 
stock market liberalization enhances liquidity, it is possible that part of the investment 
increase following stock market liberalization works through a liquidity channel that 
operates independently of the effect of liquidity on valuation.   
Table 6 presents results from regressing the growth rate of investment on 
contemporaneous and lagged changes in valuation on the two measures of liquidity used 
in Levine and Zervos (1998a): the change in turnover and the changes in value traded as 
a fraction of GDP.  The final specification, which includes contemporaneous, lagged, and 
two-year-lagged values of all three variables, is perhaps the most informative.  The fact 
that two-year-lagged change in turnover remains significant in the presence of 
contemporaneous, lagged, and two-year-lagged changes in valuation suggests that 
increased liquidity may lead to increased investment through a channel that operates 
independently of the effect of liquidity on valuation.  This is consistent with Levine and 
Zervos (1998a) who find that increased liquidity leads to higher capital stock growth 
after controlling for valuation.  
 
6. Alternative Explanations for the Investment Boom 
Thus far this paper has documented three salient facts about the stock market and 
investment in developing countries.  First, private investment booms follow stock market 
liberalizations.  Second, there is a strong positive correlation between the growth rate of 
private investment and changes in stock market valuation.  Third, this correlation is 
stronger for liberalization-specific valuation changes than for generic valuation changes.  
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Taken together with previous work which demonstrates that stock market liberalizations 
cause large increases in stock market valuation, these three facts constitute strong prima 
facie evidence that stock market liberalizations cause investment booms.  This section of 
the paper argues that there are reasons to be skeptical. 
 
6.1.  Omitted Variables 
At least one possible alternative explanation for the temporary surge in the growth 
rate of private investment is that LDC policymakers timed the liberalizations to coincide 
with high points in the world business cycle.  In the estimations ahead, in addition to 
using time dummies, real U.S. interest rates, and OECD output growth rates are used to 
try to separate the cross-sectional effects of stock market liberalization from the impact 
of the world business cycle. 
Overstating the impact of stock market liberalization on investment could also 
occur because of the contemporaneous implementation of other economic reforms.  Table 
7 documents the major economic reforms occurring in each of the 11 countries between 
1985 and 1994.  With the aid of this table, four economic reform variables are created to 
help isolate the effects of stock market liberalization.  These variables, which are given 
the obvious names Stabilize, Trade, Privatize, and Exchange, take on the value zero 
everywhere except during the years in which each of these reforms actually occur.  Like 
the Liberalize variable, 3 lags of each of the reform variables are also included in each of 
the regressions.  
In addition to controlling for the world business cycle and contemporaneous 
reforms it is important to account for domestic fundamentals such as the growth rate of 
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GDP, the terms of trade, and the external debt-to-GDP ratio.  Stronger GDP growth or a 
positive terms of trade shock could lead to stronger sales and profits resulting in an 
aggregate-demand-driven investment boom that has nothing to with stock market 
liberalization per se.  Similarly, the literature on debt overhang and investment, 
(Krugman 1988, Sachs 1989) argues that a large external debt-to-GDP ratio acts as a drag 
on investment.  Therefore, a large exogenous fall in the external debt-to-GDP ratio could 
also lead to a substantial increase in future investment that is unrelated to stock market 
liberalization.  
The following regression uses these variables to control for world business cycle 
effects, contemporaneous economic reforms, and aggregate demand conditions  
(8) 
ititit
itititiit
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BCYCLE  is an abbreviation for the variables which proxy for the world business cycle: 
year dummies, the real U.S. Treasury bill rate, and the logarithmic growth rate of OECD 
industrial production.  The term  denotes the matrix of reform variables.  The 
Fundamentals are two lags of the growth rate of GDP, the contemporaneous growth rate 
of the terms of trade, and the contemporaneous growth rate of the external debt-to-GDP 
ratio.
Reforms
26  The final specification closely resembles Fischer (1991), Warner (1992), and 
Cohen (1993). 
 Table 8 presents the results of three different variations on equation (8).  The first 
uses only year dummies as a business cycle proxy, the second uses the real Treasury bill 
rate and the growth rate of OECD industrial production, and the third uses all three world 
business cycle measures.  In order to conserve space, the estimates of the business cycle 
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variables, and fundamentals are not presented in the table.27  Column 1 shows that when 
year dummies and fundamentals are included, the coefficient on  falls to 0.130 
and is no longer significant.  The coefficients on  and  actually 
increase to 0.326 and 0.198 respectively.  It is interesting to note that the growth rate of 
investment is also significantly higher than the sample mean in the years following a 
number of the other reforms.  For example, the coefficient on all of the Stabilize variables 
is positive, and the coefficients of 0.218 on Stabilize1 and 0.165 on Stabilize3 are both 
statistically significant.  The relationship between investment and the other reforms is 
less robust.  The coefficients on Trade2, Privatize2, and Exchange2 are all positive and 
statistically significant, but the coefficients on Trade1, Trade3, Privatize, Privatize3, and 
Exchange are all negative. 
1PostLib
2PostLib 3PostLib
Column 2 controls for world business cycle effects by including the 
contemporaneous value of the real U.S. Treasury bill rate and the growth rate of OECD 
industrial production as right-hand-side variables.  Under this specification, the 
coefficient on  is 0.244 and again significant at the one-percent level.  The 
coefficient on  falls to 0.104, but remains significant.  The reform variable 
coefficients are qualitatively identical to those of the specification in column 1.  Multiple 
leads and lags of the interest rate and growth rate of industrial production were also tried, 
but only the contemporaneous values displayed any significant effect.  As a final test of 
robustness, year dummies, the real Treasury bill rate, and OECD growth rates were all 
included simultaneously.  The estimates are presented in column 3.  This time PostLib1, 
PostLib2, and PostLib3 are all statistically significant with point estimates almost 
identical to those in column 1.   
2PostLib
3PostLib
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The evidence in Table 8 demonstrates that the investment liberalization 
correlations are robust to a number of potential omitted variables, but should still be 
interpreted with caution.  Although Table 8 documents a number of significant reforms, it 
does not directly capture elements such as judicial reform or public sector accountability 
changes.  These changes may be prerequisites for a successful stock market 
liberalization.  To the extent that the stock market liberalization dummy variable 
inadvertently captures such changes, the estimated impact of liberalization on investment 
may still be overstated.   
 
6.2. Reverse Causality 
The evidence in Table 8 demonstrates that the effect of stock market liberalization 
on investment is reasonably robust to the omitted variable critique, but it does not 
directly address the concern that causality might literally run in the opposite direction.  
There are at least three possible stories as to why the direction of causation might be 
reversed.  First, governments might liberalize in response to abnormally high investment 
demand in previous years.  Second, an exogenous fall in the world cost of capital relative 
to the local cost could cause governments to open the domestic stock market to 
foreigners.  Third, policymakers might liberalize in anticipation of positive future shocks 
to the marginal productivity of capital.  In the absence of suitable instruments for stock 
market liberalization, timing evidence is used to evaluate the plausibility of these three 
stories. 
If past investment booms cause liberalizations, then we should see liberalizations 
following surges in private investment.  Figure 1 is not consistent with this first story of 
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reverse causality.  Figure 1 is, however, consistent with the second story of reverse 
causality.  If the world cost of capital falls relative to the local cost, local businesses may 
lobby their governments to allow foreign capital in.  In this case private investment will 
not rise until after the liberalization, even though the fall in the world cost of capital is 
causing the liberalization.28  Figure 1 is also consistent with the third story of reverse 
causality.  Suppose that policymakers liberalize because they correctly anticipate that the 
marginal productivity of capital will be higher in the future.  In this case, the growth rate 
of private investment will rise following stock market liberalization, but the 
liberalizations clearly do not cause the increase.  The future increase in the marginal 
productivity of capital causes both the liberalization and the investment boom. 
The fact that we cannot rule out reverse causality calls for a measured 
interpretation of the evidence in Table 8.  This sample is somewhat special, because the 
universe of developing countries that liberalized their stock markets did so after 
beginning the crucial process of economic reform and at a time of relatively low real 
world interest rates.  Suppose at some point in the future a developing country were to 
liberalize its stock market before implementing other reforms and at a time when the 
world cost of capital is relatively high.  In that case it is not clear that the liberalizing 
country would see investment effects on the same order of magnitude as the countries in 
this sample. 
The general implication then is not that stock market liberalizations cause 
investment booms.  Rather, the following seems like a more reasonable summary of the 
evidence.  In environments where the marginal product of capital is high and the 
domestic cost of capital exceeds the world cost of capital, Tobin’s q predicts that capital 
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account liberalization can lead to large increases in investment; the data are consistent 
with this prediction. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates that the developing countries in this sample experienced 
abnormally high growth rates of private investment after liberalizing their stock markets.  
Because it is possible that exogenous falls in the world cost of capital and expected 
shocks to the future marginal productivity of domestic capital could cause both the 
investment booms and the liberalizations, we cannot necessarily conclude that stock 
market liberalizations cause investment booms.  Nevertheless, the evidence presented 
here is relevant for the debate on whether or not capital account liberalization has any 
effect on real investment.  
Previous papers tested the hypothesis that capital account liberalization has 
permanent effects on investment and found no supporting evidence.  However, standard 
models predict that capital account liberalization will cause a temporary increase in the 
growth rate of investment.  This paper uses event study techniques to examine whether 
the data are consistent with this theoretical prediction.  The fact that stock market 
liberalizations are consistently followed by a temporary increase in the growth rate of 
investment which cannot be explained away by world business cycle effects, 
contemporaneous economic reforms, or domestic aggregate demand conditions, suggests 
that capital account liberalization may matter for investment after all. 
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Table 1 
First stock market liberalization and controls on capital outflows 
 
The stock market liberalization dates are based on information obtained from the following sources: 
Levine and Zervos (1994), The Wilson Directory of Emerging Market Funds, IFC Investable Indices, 
Park and Van Agtmael (1993), Price (1994), The Economist Intelligence Unit (various issues), The 
Economist Guide to World Stock Markets (1988), the IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and 
Restrictions (various issues)..  Percentage change in total return index: the percentage change in the 
real dollar value of the IFC’s total return index over the 12 month period leading up to the country’s 
initial stock market liberalization.  Restrictions on capital transactions using resident-owned funds: a 
‘Yes’ entry under this column indicates that according to the International Monetary Fund’s 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, restrictions on the use of domestic residents’ 
funds for capital transactions were still in place when the country’s stock market was liberalized to 
the inward flow of foreign capital.  Restrictions on domestic residents’ ability to own foreign 
securities: a ‘Yes’ entry under this column indicates that according to Kim and Singal (1998) there 
were restrictions on domestic residents’ ability to purchase foreign securities when the country’s 
stock market was liberalized to the inward flow of foreign capital.  *, according to the table entitled, 
“Summary features of exchange and trade systems in member countries” (p. 557 of IMF Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 1987), Malaysia had no restrictions on the use of resident-
owned domestic funds.  However, the discussion on page 333 of the same publication, which lists the 
rules governing capital flows in and out of Malaysia, indicates that there were some restrictions on 
capital outflows. 
Country Date of First Stock 
Market Liberalization 
Details About the Liberalization Percentage change in 
total return index 
Argentina November 1989 Policy Decree: The Liberalization began with 
the New Foreign Investment Regime in 
November 1989.  Legal limits on the type and 
nature of foreign investments were reduced 
(Park and Van Agtmael, 1993, page 326). 
98.7 
    
Brazil March 1988 Country Fund Introduction: “The Brazil 
Fund Incorporated” (The Wilson Directory of 
Emerging Market Funds, page 17). 
19.6 
    
Chile May 1987 Country Fund Introduction: “The Toronto 
Trust Mutual Fund” (The Wilson Directory of 
Emerging Market Funds, page 17). 
39.6 
    
Colombia December 1991 Policy Decree: Resolution 52 allowed foreign 
investors to purchase up to 100 percent of 
locally listed companies (Price, 1994). 
109 
    
India June 1986 Country Fund Introduction: “The India 
Fund” (The Wilson Directory of Emerging 
Market Funds, page 12). 
53.1 
    
Korea June 1987 Country Fund Introduction: “The Korea 
Europe Fund Limited” (The Wilson Directory of 
Emerging Market Funds, page 13). 
27.7 
    
Malaysia May 1987 Country Fund Introduction: “The Wardley 
GS Malaysia Fund” (The Wilson Directory of 
62.5 
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Emerging Market Funds, page 14). 
    
Mexico May 1989 Policy Decree: Restrictions on foreign portfolio 
inflows were substantially liberalized (Levine 
and Zervos, 1994). 
30.7 
    
The  
Philippines 
May 1986 Country Fund Introduction: “The Thornton 
Philippines Redevelopment Fund Limited” (The 
Wilson Directory of Emerging Market Funds, 
page 15). 
72.9 
    
Thailand January 1988 Country Fund Introduction: “The Siam Fund 
Limited” (The Wilson Directory of Emerging 
Market Funds, page 16). 
41.6 
    
Venezuela January 1990 Policy Decree: Decree 727 completely opens 
the market to foreign investors except for bank 
stocks (Levine and Zervos, 1994). 
32.5 
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Endnotes  
 
1 See for example Stapleton and Subrahmanyan (1977), Errunza and Losq (1985), Eun and Janakiramanan 
(1986), Alexander et. al. (1987), and Stulz (1999b). 
 
2 Stock market liberalization need not always cause a fall in the cost of capital.  A country’s cost of equity 
capital has two components: the equity premium and the risk free rate.  Stock market liberalization 
increases risk sharing and liquidity, thereby reducing the equity premium.  Liberalization may also affect 
net capital inflows, which has implications for the risk-free rate.  If the risk-free rate falls after 
liberalization, then the country’s cost of capital unequivocally falls.  If the risk-free rate rises following 
liberalization, then the country’s cost of capital could increase.  Whether the risk-free rate rises or falls 
following liberalization depends on whether the autarky risk-free rate, which is an equilibrium outcome of 
aggregate savings and investment, is above or below the world rate.  Section 3 presents a detailed 
discussion of these issues. 
 
3 This is equivalent to saying that the economy reaches its new optimal capital labor ratio 
 
4 A temporary increase in the growth rate of the capital stock also implies a temporary increase in the 
growth rate of investment.  A simple example will help clarify this point.  Let  denote the initial capital 
stock and assume the capital stock is initially growing at rate g so that (i.e. g
K
K
t
t =&
tt KI &=
).  
Investment, I, is defined as the change in the capital stock, that is,  where a dot over a variable 
denotes the time derivative of that variable.  Hence, g
K
K
I
I
KI
t
t
t
t
tt ==⇒=
&&&& .  The growth rate of the 
capital stock and the growth rate of investment are the same.  Therefore, a temporary increase in the 
growth rate of the capital stock also implies a temporary increase in the growth rate of investment.  
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5 For a survey of this evidence, see Rama (1993).  
 
6 See Agénor and Montiel (1996) on this point. 
 
7 A complete discussion of the dating procedure is contained in Section 4. 
 
8 It is important to note that this is not necessarily the case.  See the discussion in Section 3. 
 
9 Assuming no bubbles, this is precisely the value of the country’s stock market.  We are also making here 
the simplifying assumption that all profits are paid out as dividends. 
 
10 The assumption that r>r* is the standard assumption about the autarky interest rate in developing 
countries relative to the rest of the world.  The alternative assumption of r<r* is considered shortly. 
 
11 Levine and Zervos (1998a) find no impact of that increased capital market integration on savings rates.  
See Agénor and Montiel (1996) for an extensive review of the empirical literature on financial 
liberalization and savings. 
 
12 Markets that are mildly segmented ex-ante should experience a smaller decline than fully segmented 
markets.  See Errunza and Losq (1989). 
 
13  The fact that shareholders demand a liquidity premium means that in addition to the premium they 
require for bearing systematic risk they also require compensation for the frictional costs of trading equity 
(Ahimud and Mendelson; 1986, 1997).  This is equivalent to saying that the equity premium, θ , consists 
of two components: (1) the premium required for bearing systematic risk, and (2) a liquidity premium.  
Therefore, increased liquidity also reduces the equity premium. 
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14 See Table 1, Table 4, and Table 5 of their paper. 
 
15 The countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, The Philippines, 
Thailand, and Venezuela. 
 
16 If the liberalization is anticipated then the change in valuation will occur prior to the actual 
implementation.  A 12-month window is chosen here to capture announcement effects.  For a detailed 
discussion of the issues involved in trying to precisely date liberalization announcements, see Henry 
(1997), Errunza and Miller (1998), and Bekaert and Harvey (1998). 
 
17 The countries analyzed in Henry’s paper are identical to those in this paper except that he also includes 
Taiwan.  Taiwan is not included in this study, because investment data was not available for Taiwan.  
 
18 The estimation procedure explicitly allows for heteroskedacity in computing standard errors, but with an 
unbalanced panel it is not possible to relax the assumption of no cross-country correlation.  The year 
dummies are an imperfect attempt to control for cross-country correlation. 
 
19 All right-hand-side variables in this paper are also first differences of the natural log.  The advantage of 
this is that all of the macroeconomic variables used are first-difference stationary (results not reported).  
Levels of variables such as stock prices and market capitalization may not be stationary (Levine and 
Zervos 1998b). 
 
20 The other right-hand-side variables were dropped to preserve degrees of freedom. 
 
21 The 7 countries for which the DW statistic rejects first-order autocorrelation are as follows: Argentina 
(2.76), Brazil (1.85), Chile (2.80), India (2.12), The Philippines (2.04), Thailand (2.17), and Venezuela 
(2.01). The numbers in parentheses are the DW test statistic for that country. 
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22 The 4 countries are Colombia (1.39), Korea (1.51), Malaysia (1.21), and Mexico (1.51). 
 
23 The use of stock returns as a proxy for changes in q is another difference between this specification and 
those in the literature on investment in developed countries.  The reason for this is that the debt variables 
needed to construct an aggregate measure of q are not available.  This is not a major concern as Barro 
(1990) and Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993) both find that lagged stock market returns out-perform q 
as a predictor of future real investment. 
 
24 The F value is 5.25.  Probability > F = 0.024. 
 
25 See Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993) and Stein (1996) for a more detailed treatment of this issue. 
 
26 I tried adding further lags of these right-hand-side variables, but they contribute very little explanatory 
power, so they were dropped.  Contemporaneous values of the terms of trade and the debt-to-gdp ratio 
were dropped for the same reason.  I don’t include contemporaneous GDP on the right hand side because 
of the obvious simultaneity bias.  In fact, if there is serial correlation in the error term, including lagged 
GDP introduces the same bias.  However, I tested for serial correlation and there was no evidence that this 
is a problem. 
 
27 These are available from the author upon request.  Notable points about these estimates are that the year 
dummies in the early 80s are negative and significant, reflecting the effects of the Volcker recession.  The 
Treasury bill rate and OECD industrial production variables have the expected a priori signs. 
 
28 I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this example. 
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